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Abstract
This paper provides a model of involuntary unemployment by combining the insights of the sticky wage theory and the eﬃciency wage theory.
It implies that employed workers tend to supply more eﬀort in response to
economic downturns. So, a negative shock to an economy has intriguing
impacts on the unemployment. The model also shows that a negative demand shock may have a relatively small eﬀect on output since changes in
work eﬀort serve to partially mitigate the eﬀects of the shock. Moreover,
it yields some implications that complement the existing “work-sharing”
literature.
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“Unemployment, like cancer, is a multifaceted phenomenon that comes
in many forms.” (Summers, 1988: 388)

1. Introduction
A fundamental assumption of traditional Keynesian economics is the rigidity of
nominal wage rate (e.g. Romer, 2001). Due to the sticky wage rate, a reduction
of labor demand in a recession will result in an increase in involuntary unemployment. In recent years, the studies of nominal wage rigidity have experienced
a resurgence in the research on business cycle fluctuations.1 Also, a major development of the “new” Keynesian economics is the eﬃciency wage theory. An
important insight of the eﬃciency wage theory is that higher real wages and
higher unemployment rates elicit more eﬀort from workers and hence make them
more productive.2 As the eﬃciency wage can be higher than the wage rate that
equates labor demand and labor supply, this theory provides an explanation for
the phenomena of persistent involuntary unemployment.
This paper attempts to extend the existing literature by combining the insights
of the sticky wage theory and the eﬃciency wage theory. First, based on the
eﬃciency wage theory, firms choose the optimal wage rate that maximizes profits.
Then, labor contracts are signed which specify the nominal wage. The contracts
may be explicit formal agreements of the type specified in Fischer (1977) and
Taylor (1980) or implicit informal agreements of the form described in Malcomson
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(1984). Next, this paper tries to answer the question: what will happen if an
unexpected negative shock occurs to the economy after labor contracts are signed?
In this case, as the negative shock is completely unexpected, the predetermined
eﬃciency wage may no longer maximize firms’ profits in the new macroeconomic
environment. However, as the nominal wage rate is fixed or sticky in the short
run, firms can only consider the option of laying oﬀ workers.
I begin my analyses by noting that workers will change their eﬀorts endogenously in response to unexpected negative shocks. This argument is based on the
fundamental insight of the eﬃciency wage theory that workers’ eﬀort is determined
by the unemployment rate and the real wage rate (For example, see the survey by
Romer (2001)). As the unemployment rate may rise and deflation may occur due
to a negative shock, employed workers will supply more eﬀort in response to the
economic downturn. Also, this paper is motivated by the observations in Hong
Kong in recent years. As carefully described in the appendix of the paper, in the
recent economic downturns in Hong Kong, workers usually worked overtime with
little or no extra compensation. Moreover, few workers were willing to accept a
pay cut even if they were overloaded and had to work overtime.
In this model, firms’ employment decisions are related to an increase in workers’ eﬀort in two opposite ways. On one hand, as workers supply more eﬀort,
the eﬀective labor supply (i.e. the combination between the number of employed
workers and average work eﬀort) will increase. Consequently, according to the
law of diminishing returns, firms will tend to lay oﬀ more workers.3 On the other
hand, a worker will be more productive and hence more valuable to her firm if she
3

supplies more eﬀort. Thus, firms will tend to retain/hire more workers if eﬀort
increases. The model shows that the net eﬀect of increased eﬀort on employment
will depend on the properties of the production technology and the extent to
which agents modify their work eﬀorts. Thus, by analyzing sticky wage and the
endogeneity of workers’ eﬀort simultaneously, this paper complements the existing
literature of unemployment.
This paper is related to Bils and Chang (2003), who investigate the welfare
costs of sticky wages when eﬀort can respond. It extends Bils and Chang (2003)
in two aspects. Firstly, because Bils and Chang (2003) adopt the approach that
labor markets always clear, there is no involuntary unemployment in their model.
In contrast, the current paper aims to examine how endogenous eﬀort aﬀects
involuntary unemployment when nominal wage is sticky. Secondly, an implicit
assumption in Bils and Chang (2003) is that every worker’s individual eﬀort is
completely observable so that “....Under sticky wages....(w)orkers must produce
enough to merit the specified wage in order to maintain employment” (Page 313).
However, in reality, as emphasized by the literature of eﬃciency wages, a worker’s
individual eﬀort is often not completely observable (e.g. in team production),
which implies that it is often more appropriate to analyze workers’ endogenous
eﬀorts based on the theory of eﬃciency wages.
Moreover, this analysis generates several other macroeconomic and policy implications. It shows that a negative demand shock may have a relatively small
eﬀect on output since changes in work eﬀort serve to partially mitigate the eﬀects
of the shock. Also, this paper is related to the “work-sharing” literature, which
4

investigates whether a reduction of the working time of the employed can lead
to an increase or decrease in employment.4 By considering that labor input includes both working hours and working intensity, the current paper extends this
literature. For example, it suggests that the “work-sharing” scheme may not be
eﬀective in aﬀecting wage and employment because reduced working hours may be
oﬀset by increased working intensity/eﬀort. Further, the model implies that the
“work-sharing” scheme will reduce real output even if it can increase employment.
In what follows, Section 2 sets up the basic framework. Section 3 analyzes the
impacts of a negative shock on workers’ eﬀorts and involuntary unemployment.
Section 4 explores other macroeconomic implications of the model. Section 5
summarizes the paper. The appendix discusses the empirical motivations of this
paper.

2. The Basic Analytical Framework
This section is completely based on the standard textbook version of the eﬃciency
wage theory with slight modifications (see Chapter 9, Romer, 2001). There are a
large number, N, of identical competitive firms. For simplicity, “N” is assumed
to be fixed in the short run. The representative firm seeks to maximize its profits,
which are given by
π = PQ − WL

(2.1)

where P is the price level, Q is the firm’s quantity of output, W is the nominal
wage, L is the number of workers it hires.
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A firm’s output depends on both the number of workers it employs and their
eﬀort. Thus the representative firm’s output is
Q = F (eL), F 0 (•) > 0, F 00 (•) < 0

(2.2)

where e denotes workers’ eﬀort.
The eﬃciency wage theory posits that workers’ eﬀort increases with the real
wage rate and the unemployment rate (e.g. Solow, 1979; Summers, 1988). Namely,
e = e(

W
, u), e1 > 0, e2 > 0
P

(2.3)

where “u” denotes the unemployment rate.
Finally, there are L identical workers, each of whom supplies one unit of labor
inelastically.
Based on the above description, the problem facing the representative firm is
max P F [e(
L,W

W
, u)L] − W L
P

(2.4)

If there are unemployed workers, the firm can choose the wage freely. If unemployment is zero, on the other hand, the firm must pay at least the wage paid by
other firms.
Since there are a large number of firms, each individual firm regards “u” as
given. Then, the first order conditions for L and W are
∂π
W
W
= P F 0 [e( , u)L]e( , u) − W = 0
∂L
P
P
∂π
W
W
= F 0 [e( , u)L]e1 ( , u)L − L = 0
∂W
P
P
6

(2.5)
(2.6)

Since firms are identical, each firm chooses the same values of W and L.
Total labor demand is therefore NL. To guarantee an interior solution, I assume
NL < L. In this case, the number of unemployed workers is
L − NL
So,
u=

L − NL
L

(2.7)

Plugging (2.7) into (2.5) and (2.6), I can get a firm’s optimal choice of W and L,
which are denoted by W ∗ and L∗ respectively.

3. Sticky Wage, Eﬃciency Wage, and Unemployment
In this section, I will examine the combined implications of the sticky wage theory
and the eﬃciency wage theory on workers’ eﬀort and unemployment in an economic downturn. First, based on the eﬃciency wage theory discussed in the last
section, firms choose the optimal wage rate that maximizes profits. Then, labor
contracts are signed which specify the nominal wage at the level of W ∗ . Next, I
assume that after labor contracts are signed, a completely unexpected negative
shock occurs to the economy.
I assume that the economy here is a small open economy so that firms in this
economy take the price of the output, P , as given. Hence, the negative shock to
the economy here can be simply modelled as a fall of the price of output, P .5 As
the negative shock is completely unexpected, the predetermined eﬃciency wage,
W ∗ , may no longer maximize firms’ profit in the new macroeconomic environment.
7

However, as the nominal wage rate is fixed or sticky in the short run, firms can
only consider the option of laying oﬀ workers.
I begin my analyses by noting that workers will change their eﬀorts endogenously in response to unexpected negative shocks. Formally, in this case, workers’
endogenous eﬀort, (2.3), can be rewritten as
e = e(

W∗
, u)
P

(3.1)

From (3.1), we can see that employed workers tend to work harder in a recession
for two reasons. Firstly, when a negative shock to the economy occurs (i.e. P
decreases), the real wage,

W∗
,
P

will increase. Recall that e1 > 0, so a worker will

exert more eﬀort in response to the negative shock. Secondly, note that we also
have e2 > 0, so a worker’s eﬀort will increase further when the unemployment
rate rises in a recession.
Since the wage rate is fixed in this section, the only choice variable for a
firm is “L”. From (2.5), I can rewrite the first order condition of a firm’s profit
maximization problem as
P F 0 (eL)e − W ∗ = 0

(3.2)

In the existing literature on sticky wage and unemployment, workers’ endogenous eﬀort in response to the change of economic environment has usually been
ignored. In other words, it has treated workers’ eﬀort as a fixed parameter. In
this case, totally diﬀerentiating (3.2) with respect to L and P (and regarding e
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as a fixed parameter) and rearranging, I get
F0
∂L
=−
>0
∂P
eP F 00

(3.3)

Thus, if workers’ endogenous eﬀort is not considered, the relationship between
the change of employment and the change of the macroeconomic environment is
characterized by (3.3).
When we consider that e is an endogenous variable, the easiest way to derive
the relationship between L and P is through plugging (3.1) and (2.7) into (3.2)
and then totally diﬀerentiating (3.2) with respect to L and P . However, it would
be diﬃcult to see the economic intuitions from this straightforward derivation.
So, to better explain how workers’ endogenous eﬀort aﬀects employment, I will
derive the results in the following more indirect way. In this case, noting that L
is a function of both e and P , we have

∂L ∂L de
dL
=
+
dP
∂P
∂e dP
∂L ∂L ∂e
∂e du
=
+
(
+
)
∂P
∂e ∂P
∂u dP
∂e ∂u dL
∂L ∂L ∂e
+
(
+
)
=
∂P
∂e ∂P
∂u ∂L dP

(3.4)

Note that (3.1) and (2.7) imply that
W ∗ e1
∂e
=− 2 <0
∂P
P

(3.5)

Ne2
∂e ∂u
=−
<0
∂u ∂L
L

(3.6)
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So, the magnitude (or even the sign) of

dL
dP

depends crucially on the sign of

∂L
,
∂e

which measures the correlation between workers’ eﬀort and the level of employment. To obtain the expression of

∂L
,
∂e

I totally diﬀerentiate (3.2) with respect to

L and e and rearrange, then I get
F 0 + eLF 00
∂L
=−
∂e
e2 F 00

(3.7)

Note that the denominator of (3.7) is negative since F 00 < 0. So, if F 0 + eLF 00 >
(<)0, we have
∂L
> (<)0
∂e
The intuition of the above result is as follows. On one hand, as workers supply
more eﬀort, ceteris paribus, the eﬀective labor supply (i.e. eL ) will increase. As
the eﬀective labor supply increases, according to the law of diminishing returns,
firms will tend to lay oﬀ more workers. On the other hand, as workers’ eﬀort
increases, the value of each worker to the firm increases, which implies that firms
will tend to retain/hire more workers. From (3.7), we can see that the net eﬀect
will depend on the curvature of the production function. If the marginal product
of labor decreases little with eﬀective labor supply, eL, the absolute value of F 00
will be small. In this case, firms will choose to retain more workers in response to
an increase of workers’ eﬀort. However, if the production function exhibits strong
diminishing returns, then firms will choose to lay oﬀ more workers as e increases.
Now, to derive the expression of

dL
,
dP

I rearrange (3.4) as follows,

dL
∂L ∂L ∂e
∂L ∂e ∂u dL
=
+
+
dP
∂P
∂e ∂P
∂e ∂u ∂L dP
10

namely
∂L ∂e ∂u
dL
∂L ∂L ∂e
[1 −
]=
+
dP
∂e ∂u ∂L
∂P
∂e ∂P

(3.8)

Plugging (3.3), (3.5), (3.6) and (3.7) into (3.8) and rearranging, I get

∂L ∂e ∂u
dL
∂L ∂L ∂e
= [
+
]/[1 −
]
dP
∂P
∂e ∂P
∂e ∂u ∂L
F 0 + eLF 00
Ne2
F 0 + eLF 00 W ∗ e1
F0
)]
(−
)]/[1
−
(−
)(−
−
= [−
2
2
2
00
00
00
eP F
eF
P
eF
L
L[(W ∗ e1 − eP )F 0 + W ∗ ee1 LF 00 ]
=
(3.9)
P 2 [(Le2 − Nee2 L)F 00 − Ne2 F 0 ]
(3.9) and (3.4) imply that there is an intriguing relationship between employment and the change of economic environment when we take workers’ endogenous
eﬀort into account. Comparing (3.3) and (3.4), we can see that if the prediction
of unemployment is based on the sticky wage theory but it ignores the implications of the eﬃciency wage theory, then the impact of the negative shock on
unemployment will be either overestimated or underestimated. The impact of a
negative demand shock on increasing unemployment will be overstated if
or F 0 + eLF 00 > 0; it will be understated if

∂L
∂e

∂L
∂e

>0

< 0 or F 0 + eLF 00 < 0. Moreover,

comparing (3.3) with (3.4) and noting (3.7), (3.5), (3.6) and (3.9), we can see that
the magnitude of this overestimation or underestimation is the absolute value of
the following item

∂e ∂u dL
∂L ∂e
(
+
)
∂e ∂P
∂u ∂L dP
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F 0 + eLF 00
W ∗ e1 Ne2 L[(W ∗ e1 − eP )F 0 + W ∗ ee1 LF 00 ]
{−
−
}
e2 F 00
P2
L P 2 [(Le2 − Nee2 L)F 00 − Ne2 F 0 ]
(F 0 + eLF 00 ){W ∗ e1 [(Le2 − Nee2 L)F 00 − Ne2 F 0 ] + Ne2 [(W ∗ e1 − eP )F 0 + W ∗ ee1 LF 00 ]}
=
e2 F 00 P 2 [(Le2 − Nee2 L)F 00 − Ne2 F 0 ]
(F 0 + eLF 00 )[(W ∗ ee1 L − Nee2 L + Le2 )F 00 − Ne2 eP F 0 ]
=
(3.10)
e2 F 00 P 2 [Ne2 F 0 + (Nee2 L − Le2 )F 00 ]
= −

Thus, as firms may either retain or lay oﬀ more workers in response to the
increase of workers’ eﬀort, the amount of increased unemployment in a recession
predicted by the combined insights of both the eﬃciency wage theory and the
sticky wage theory can be significantly diﬀerent from that predicted by the sticky
wage theory alone.

4. Eﬀort, Real Output, and Policy Implications
In this section, I first analyze the impact of endogenous eﬀort on real output.
From (2.2), namely Q = F (eL), we know that the real output is determined by
the eﬀective labor supply (i.e. eL).
As in the last section, the change of macroeconomic environment is again
modelled as the change of “P ”. Then, the relationship between eﬀective labor
supply and the change of macroeconomic environment is
de
dL
d(eL)
=L
+e
dP
dP
dP
As

de
dP

(4.1)

de
dL
dL
+ e dP
can be much less than e dP
. In other words, the change
< 0, L dP

of eﬀective labor supply due to a negative shock can be much smaller than what
is predicted by a model in which workers’ endogenous eﬀorts are not taken into
12

account. The intuition of this result is explained earlier: in an economic downturn,
while few people work, those who are employed tend to work harder. So, the
change of the percentage of eﬀective labor supply may be much smaller than that
of employment. More specifically, from (3.5), (3.6) and (3.9), we get
d(eL)
de
dL
= L
+e
dP
dP
dP
∂e
∂e ∂u dL
dL
= L(
+
)+e
∂P
∂u ∂L dP
dP
∂e ∂u
dL
∂e
+ (L
+ e)
= L
∂P
∂u ∂L
dP
∗
LNe2 L[(W ∗ e1 − eP )F 0 + W ∗ ee1 LF 00 ]
Lw e1
+
(e
−
= −
) 2
P2
L
P [(Le2 − Nee2 L)F 00 − N e2 F 0 ]
From (4.2), we can see that under some parameter configurations, the value of

(4.2)
d(eL)
dP

can be very small. This result implies that a negative demand shock may have
a relatively small eﬀect on output since changes in work eﬀort serve to partially
mitigate the eﬀects of the shock. Thus, the decrease in real output caused by a
negative shock may be much less than what would be predicted by a model in
which workers’ endogenous eﬀorts are not considered.
Next, I discuss the policy implications of the model in relation to the “worksharing” literature. First, when it is considered that labor input includes not
only working hours but also working eﬀort/intensity, the current paper suggests
that the “work-sharing” scheme may often be hard to implement because eﬀort is
largely unobservable. In an important contribution, Hunt (1999) finds that when
the “work-sharing” scheme was implemented in Germany for the period between
1984 and 1994, the hourly wage rose substantially enough that workers were fully
13

compensated pecuniarily for the declines in actual hours worked.6 Hunt (1999)
provides several interesting explanations for her findings. This paper suggests that
a possible complementary explanation to Hunt (1999) is that when the standard
hours of work were reduced, workers might have increased their eﬀort/intensity
so that the total labor input might have remained largely unchanged. Therefore,
firms were willing to pay the workers with about the same monthly wage as before.
Second, it should be noted that in an abstract sense, we may regard a worker’s
eﬀort, “e”, in the model as the combination of a worker’s working hours and
working intensity. Now, I try to answer the following question: Suppose that the
“work-sharing” scheme does achieve the goal of reducing “e” under some circumstances (e.g. workers are not allowed to work overtime and working intensity has
reached the maximum), what are the impacts of this policy on employment and
real output?
Firstly, as discussed earlier, we will have “ ∂L
> 0” if and only if “F 0 + eLF 00 >
∂e
0”. In other words, the impact of this policy on employment is theoretically ambiguous. In particular, if “F 0 +eLF 00 < 0”, then the “work-sharing” scheme, which
reduces “e”, will lead to a reduction of employment when nominal wage is sticky.
This implication is consistent with the empirical finding of Hunt (1999), who
shows that the “work-sharing” scheme actually reduced employment in Germany
in the period 1984–1994.
Secondly, noting (3.7), we have
d(L)
d(eL)
= L+e
de
de
14

= L−e
= −

F 0 + eLF 00
e2 F 00

F0
eF 00

> 0
“ d(eL)
> 0” means that a reduction in hours or/and eﬀorts per worker will result
de
in a decrease in the total eﬀective labor supply. Thus, no matter whether the
“work-sharing” scheme succeeds in increasing employment or not, it will result in
a decrease in real output.

5. Summary
Both the sticky wage theory and the eﬃciency wage theory are cornerstone theories of involuntary unemployment in macroeconomics. However, in the existing
literature, to my best knowledge no attempt has been made to explore the combined implications of these two theories. This paper intends to help fill this gap.
The basic structure of the model is as follows. First, based on the eﬃciency wage
theory, firms choose the optimal wage rate that maximizes profits. Then, labor
contracts are signed which specify the nominal wage. Next, I try to answer the
question: what will happen if an unexpected negative shock occurs to an economy
after labor contracts are signed?
The model implies that in economic downturns, while few people work, those
who are employed tend to work harder. Moreover, it suggests that firms’ employment decisions are related to workers’ eﬀort in a rather complex way. On one
hand, as eﬀective labor supply increases with workers’ eﬀort, the law of diminish15

ing returns implies that firms will tend to lay oﬀ more workers. On the other hand,
as workers’ eﬀort increases, the value of each worker to the firm increases, which
implies that firms will tend to retain more workers. The net eﬀect depends on
the property of the production function. Thus, it suggests that a negative shock
to an economy has intriguing impacts on the unemployment. In other words, the
amount of increased unemployment in a recession can be significantly diﬀerent
from the prediction of a model in which workers’ endogenous eﬀorts are not taken
into account.
The model also generates other macroeconomic and policy implications. It
shows that a negative demand shock may have a relatively small eﬀect on output
since changes in work eﬀort serve to partially mitigate the eﬀects of the shock.
Also, it suggests that as labor input includes both working hours and working
intensity, the “work-sharing” scheme may not be eﬀective in aﬀecting wage and
employment if reduced working hours are oﬀset by increased work eﬀort. Further,
it implies that the “work-sharing” scheme will reduce real output even if it can
increase employment.

16

6. Appendix: Empirical Motivations
This paper is motivated by the observations in Hong Kong for the past few years.
From late 1997 to 2004, the Hong Kong economy had generally been in a state
of economic downturn. In particular, from October 1998 to June 2004, Hong
Kong consumer prices had fallen for 66 straight months and its unemployment
rate had risen drastically.7 Meanwhile, as Hong Kong had enjoyed very rapid
economic growths for several decades before 1997, the prolonged recession was
largely unexpected. Also, it should be noted that unions have never had much
power or influence in Hong Kong. So, Hong Kong is an ideal place to study the
implications of the standard eﬃciency wage theories.
Why is the unemployment rate in Hong Kong so high? Firstly, a general consensus is that the nominal wage rate in Hong Kong has been sticky, which is related
to the currency peg between Hong Kong dollar and American dollar. In fact, for
the past five years, the average nominal wage rate in Hong Kong has experienced
slight increases despite the continuous deflations and increasing unemployment.8
Secondly, there are some concerns that the unemployment problem in Hong Kong
was worsened by the increasing trend that more and more workers frequently and
even voluntarily worked overtime without any extra pay.9
In September 2001, the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong,
one of Hong Kong’s political parties, conducted a survey on the working hours of
655 full-time employees. The following are some of the questions of the survey
and the corresponding survey results.10
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Question 1: How many days do you work overtime per week? 11
Answers:
number of days percentage of the respondents
0
38.1%
1 or 2
27.3%
3 or 4
20.3%
5 or more
14.3%
Question 2: On average, how many hours do you work overtime every day?
Answers:
number of hours
less than 1
1 to 2
3 to 4
5 or more

percentage of the respondents
23%
51.3%
19.6%
6%

Question 3: Do you receive any extra pay for your working overtime?
Answers:
Answers percentage of the respondents
Yes
21.9%
No
78.1%
Question 4: Do you think your company hires enough workers/staﬀ to do all
the required jobs?
Answers:
(1) 12.2% of the respondents: “No. My company hires so few workers/staﬀ
that my workload is almost too much to bear.”
18

(2) 45.8% of the respondents: “No. My company does not hire enough workers/staﬀ and my workload is very high. But I can still manage to handle all the
required jobs by working very hard.”
(3) 35.9% of the respondents: “Yes. There are just enough workers/staﬀ in
my company.”
(4) 6.1% of the respondents: “Yes. Actually there is a surplus of workers/staﬀ
in my company.”
Question 5: If your company plans to hire more workers (to reduce your
workload) but in the same time cut your salary, would you agree?
Answers:
Answers percentage of the respondents
Yes
15.9%
No
84.1%
The above survey results illustrate that in economic downturns, workers usually work overtime with little or no extra compensation. Meanwhile, consistent
with the implication of the sticky wage theory, few workers are willing to accept
a pay cut even if they are overloaded and have to work overtime.
Finally, from the Quarterly Report on the General Household Survey in Hong
Kong, I find the median hours of work in Hong Kong, which is complementary to
the above empirical evidence and is presented in the following table.
Table 1 is about here
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From 1995 to 1997, Hong Kong economy was in a boom; from 1998 to 2000, it
was in a recession. A simple comparison reveals that in each of the four quarters,
the median hours of work in Hong Kong is higher in the period between 1998
and 2000 than the period between 1995 and 1997. Moreover, a t-statistic test
demonstrates that the null hypothesis that the diﬀerence between the average
hours in these two periods are the same can be rejected at the 1 percent significance
level. Thus, this piece of evidence shows that a typical worker worked for longer
hours during recessions than during booms in Hong Kong.
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Table 1
The median hours of work in Hong Kong
(hours per
Year first quarter second quarter
1995 44
44
1996 45
45
1997 44
45
1998 45
1999 45
2000 47

45
45
48

week)
thrird quarter fourth quarter
45
45
48
45
45
45
45
48
48
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45
48
48
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Footnotes:

1: See, for example, the literature review in Bils and Chang (2003).
2: For example, see Solow (1979), Akerlof (1982), Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984),
Summers (1988), and Weiss (1990).
3: In the model, I adopt the assumption of small open economy so that the
output of the economy does not aﬀect its price level. But if I relax this assumption,
then an increase in output will reduce the price level, which will further reduce
employment.
4: In many western countries, “work-sharing” schemes have been proposed as
a policy instrument to reduce unemployment. This policy proposal is based on the
widespread popular belief that a reduction in hours per worker will spread the
available work around and hence increase employment. However, rigorous economic analyses indicate that “work-sharing” schemes often lead to rather complicated outcomes. For example, see Calmfors and Hoel (1989) and Hoel and
Vale (1986) for some theoretical analyses, Hunt (1999) for some empirical investigations, and Hunt (1998) for a comprehensive survey of the “work-sharing”
literature.
5: Note that the assumption of small open economy implies that prices are not
sticky (e.g. Phelps, 1990). This assumption allows us to readily apply the existing
theories of eﬃciency wage, which have not incorporated sticky price. If sticky price
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were to be considered, we then could extend the existing eﬃciency wage theories
by assuming that workers’ eﬀort is a decreasing function of firms’ realized profits,
which would lead to qualitatively the same results as those obtained in this paper.
6: Specifically, Hunt (1999) finds that when the standard hours in some industries in Germany were reduced by one hour due to the implementation of the
“work-sharing” scheme, straight-time real hourly wages rose between 2 and 2.4
percent relative to wages in industries with no reduction in standard hours. As a
one-hour fall from forty (standard) hours is equivalent to 2.5 percent, Hunt (1999)
infers that workers were almost fully compensated pecuniarily.
7: See Hong Kong Monthly Digest. For example, the unemployment rate in
Hong Kong was only 2.2 percent in 1997. But it surged to 7.8 percent in the first
quarter of 2003.
8: See Hong Kong Monthly Digest.
9: For example, see “Fearful staﬀs work longer hours for no reward,” South
China Morning Post (Hong Kong’s leading English newspaper), October 29, 2001.
10: see http://www.dab.org.hk/ (in Chinese).
11: It should be noted that in Hong Kong, employees are usually required to
work on Saturday mornings so that the standard working days per week are five
and half days.
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